A SURVEY OF MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY IN
NEW JERSEY
During the last half century the doctrine of municipal immunity
has been subjected to extensive criticism by both courts' and legal
scholars. 2 Despite such attacks, however, and recent inroads made
against it,3 most courts have recognized the basic need to preserve at
least some vestige of immunity in order to protect the essential processes
4
of government.
The difficulty which has always plagued the courts when considering an immunity question is the scope of the protection from
tort claims to be accorded municipal activities. This comment attempts
to analyze prior judicial solutions to this problem and to clarify the
current posture of New Jersey courts.
1 Cloyes v. Delaware Township, 23 N.J. 324, 329-30, 129 A.2d 1, 4 (1957); Milstrey v.
City of Hackensack, 6 N.J. 400, 407, 79 A.2d 37, 40 (1951); Casale v. Housing Authority, 42
N.J. Super. 52, 60, 125 A.2d 895, 899 (App. Div. 1956).
2 18 E. McQuILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.24a (3d ed. rev. 1963);
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 977 (4th ed. 1971); Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (pts. 1-3), 34 YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1956). Some commentators have expressed certain
reservations with the trend of the law away from the doctrine of municipal immunity.
See, e.g., Johndroe, Report of Committee on Tort Liability, 34A NIMLO MUN. L. REV.
362 (1971), wherein it is stated:
[D]uring the past year the doctrine for governmental immunity as applied to municipal corporations has been severely limited not only by legislative enactments
but also by the decisions of judicial piranha fish who appear to have some compulsion to create the image of being "super-humanitarians." Many of the decisions
of the federal and state courts reveal an apparently insatiable desire to distribute
not only public funds in the form of compensation, but also eternal guidance of
an executive, legislative and judicial nature.
Id.
a City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alas. 1962) (municipality could be held
liable for negligence in fire fighting); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130
(Fla. 1957) (municipal corporation may be held liable for the torts of police officers);
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959) (school
district held liable for injuries arising out of school bus accident); Williams v. City of
Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961) (municipality held liable for injuries arising
from failure to guard open elevator shaft); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn.
279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962) (school district held immune from liability for maintaining
defective classroom equipment); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618
(1962) (municipality liable for tortious act without regard to the proprietary-governmental
distinction). See K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIvE LAw TREATISE § 25.00 (Supp. 1970).
4 In Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957) and Holytz v. City
of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 40, 115 N.W.2d 618, 625 (1962), the courts recognized the
necessity of preserving legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial immunity.
See K. DAvIs, supra note 3.
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The doctrine of municipal immunity, although often confused
with its sister doctrine, sovereign immunity, has a separate and distinct
history. Sovereign immunity is thought to have arisen from the unique
position of the English king in feudal society,5 while municipal immunity seems to have grown from a public policy decision that a
township should not have to bear the financial responsibility for its
misdeeds.,
In Russell v. Men of Devon,7 the first case to hold a municipal entity immune from suit,8 the inhabitants of an unincorporated county

were sued for negligently failing to repair a bridge. The suit was dismissed on the grounds that traditionally there had been no remedy in
tort against the inhabitants of a township,9 that Devon was not an incorporated entity, 0 and that it was "better that an individual should
5 The king in feudal times was considered the fountainhead of justice. Muskopf v.
Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 214, 359 P.2d 457, 458-59, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89, 90-91 n.1
(1961). He could not be sued because "he is below no man and below no court of law."
1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 515-16 (2d ed. 1968); 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *255; 1 M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
43-44 (1778); Borchard, supra note 2,pt. 1, at 4.
6 Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K.B. 1788); see Mower v.
Leicester, 9 Mass. 247, 249 (1812).
7 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
8 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 213-16, 359 P.2d 457, 459, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 91 (1961). Apparently municipalities were not the target of many suits in the
early English law period because of the relative unimportance of such political entities.
English towns were not at first incorporated and had few political or civil rights and
little if any self-government. 19 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA Municipalities 590 (1948).
However in 1439 municipalities began to become incorporated in the modem sense and
by the 16th century the borough corporation was recognized as a "Body Politick that
indureth in

perpetual succession." 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Municipal

Corporation 87 (1933).
9 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. The plaintiff had contended that the Statute of Hue & Cry, 13
Ed. 1, c. 2, presented an analogous form of remedy. That law provided that the
hundreds (counties) in which felonies were committed would be answerable for those acts
and the damages sustained thereby, and plaintiff argued a cause of action could therefore
be brought against a local governing unit. Chief Justice Kenyan answered this by pointing
out that the Statute of Hue & Cry was a legislative enactment and no remedy would exist
without that enactment.
Justice Ashhurst stated on this point:
It is a strong presumption that that which never has been done cannot by law be
done at all.
100 Eng. Rep. at 362.
10 100 Eng. Rep. at 362. Even if the men of Devon could be considered incorporated,
the court pointed out:
[Wlhere an action is brought against a corporation for damages, those damages
are not to be recovered against the corporators in their individual capacity, but
out of their corporate estate: but if the county is to be considered as a corpora-
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sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience."" This last ground, basically a public policy decision, continues
as the essential justification for municipal immunity.
Russell was cited as authority in Mower v. The Inhabitants of
Leicester,x2 the first American case dealing with municipal responsibility.13 The plaintiff therein was also injured as the result of a defective
bridge. Relying on Devon, Mower contended that he should recover
because the township was an incorporated entity, was charged by statute
with the responsibility for repairing the bridge, and had a fund out of
which a judgment could be paid. However, the court summarily rejected these contentions 14 and ruled that no action could be brought
against a corporation established for the public benefit unless such a
remedy were provided for by statute. 15
Another defective bridge led the New Jersey courts to consider the
tort responsibility of its governmental entities. 16 In Freeholders ol
Sussex v. Strader17 the plaintiff brought an action against the Board of
Chosen Freeholders for damages he allegedly suffered due to their
failure to repair a bridge. The court, after considering Russell,18 ruled
tion, there is no corporation fund out of which satisfaction is to be made.
Id.
11 Id.

12 9 Mass. 247, 248 (1812).
Is Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 215, 359 P.2d 457, 459, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 91 (1961).
14 9 Mass. at 249.
15 Id. The court expressed its reasoning as follows:
[Q]uasi corporations, created by the legislature for purposes of public policy, are
subject, by the common law, to an indictment for the neglect of duties enjoined
on them; but are not liable to an action for such neglect, unless the action be
given by some statute. The only action furnished by statute, in this case, is for
This question is fully discussed in the case of
double damages after notice ....
Russell & Al. vs. The Men of Devon, cited at the bar, and the reasoning there is
conclusive against the action.
Id. (footnote omitted).
16 Freeholders of Sussex v. Strader, 18 N.J.L. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1840).
It should be noted that the New Jersey courts make no distinction as far as tort
liability is concerned between municipalities and quasi-municipalities such as counties and
school districts. Jackson v. Hankinson, 51 N.J. 230, 233, 238 A.2d 685, 687 (1968) (board
of education); Kent v. County of Hudson, 102 N.J. Super 208, 219, 224-25, 245 A.2d 747,
753, 756 (App. Div. 1968), afl'd, 53 N.J. 546, 251 A.2d 760 (1969) (county); Wall v. Hudson
County Park Comm'n, 80 N.J. Super. 372, 376, 193 A.2d 857, 859 (App. Div. 1963) (county
park commission).
17 18 N.J.L. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1840).
18 The court rejects the Russell reasoning that an action could not be brought
against a county because it was not incorporated nor did it have a corporate fund out of
which a judgment could be satisfied, stating that the argument was merely "thrown out,
arguendo." Id. at 116.
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that the action was not brought against the county, but rather against
the freeholders individually and observed:
[N]ot a solitary case is on record, of such public officer having been
held liable for damages to individuals by reason of a neglect of his
public duties. 19
This observation does not accurately represent the legal responsibilities
of public officers at common law. In fact, they were often held responsible for their torts.20 Chief Justice Hornblower, in a concurring opinion, stated a sounder position when he concluded that the repairing of
a road was a public duty, the remedy for a breach of which was the
21
criminal sanction of presentment.

In 1884 New Jersey abandoned the Strader rationale 22 and substi19 Id. at 118.
20 Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 9-16 (1963). See DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (8th ed. 1923), where the author
states:
With us every official, from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector
of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without legal
justification as any other citizen. The Reports abound with cases in which
officials have been brought before the Courts, and made, in their personal
capacity, liable to punishment, or to the payment of damages ....
Id. at 189. See also Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the Crown, in 6 OXFOm STUDIES IN
SOCIAL AND LEGAL HisroRy (1921).
21 The Chief Justice reasoned:
The principle of law, I take to be this: that where a corporate body, whether of a
municipal or of a private character, owes a specific duty to an individual, an
action will lie for a breach or neglect of that duty, whenever such breach or
neglect has occasioned an injury to that individual: but if such corporation, owe a
duty to the public, and neglect to perform it, although every individual comprising
that public, is thereby injured, some more, and some less, yet they can have
no private remedy, at the common law.
18 N.J.L. at 121 (Hornblower, C.J., concurring). This analysis indicates a remedy in the
nature of a public nuisance. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 89, at 605-08
(3d ed. 1964).
The situation referred to by the Chief Justice wherein a single individual is the
only one injured by a public nuisance was considered in Jersey City v. Kiernan, 50 N.J.L.
246, 13 A. 717 (Sup. Ct. 1888). The court, in response to that problem, stated:
[T]hat whenever an indictment will not lie for such a neglect as is here complained of, attended with such consequences as have here ensued, the person thus
specially injured may, in order to right the wrong, resort to an action. The injury
is altogether private in its character and is capable of being continued indefinitely,
so that under some circumstances the land might, in substance, be applied to the
public use without compensation. The injustice done and the necessity for a
remedy are alike obvious, and it would be to push to an extreme the doctrine
which, under most circumstances, gives immunity to the community in case of the
misconduct of public officials.
Id. at 250, 13 A. at 170; accord, Waters v. Newark, 56 N.J.L. 361, 363, 28 A. 717, 718 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 57 N.J.L. 456, 35 A. 1131 (Ct. Err. & App. 1894). See Weintraub & Conford,
Tort Liability of Municipalities in New Jersey, 3 MERcER BEASLEY L. REV. 142, 155-64

(1934).
22 Weintraub & Conford, supra note 21, at 142.
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tuted a rule similar to the one espoused in Devon and Mower. In Condict v. Jersey City2 3 the court held that a municipality would not be
answerable for its torts since such entities were required by law to perform certain actions and derived no special benefit therefrom. 24 Thus,
New Jersey adopted the public policy theory of municipal immunity
and this explanation served as the basic tenet until very recently.
Although Condict and the other early cases did not contain any
language limiting municipal immunity, courts soon realized the harshness of such an all-inclusive approach and began to carve out exceptions. The first of these was set forth in Hart v. Board of Chosen Freeholders.25 In that case the municipality had left an unguarded excavation
in the middle of the road into which the plaintiff fell, injuring himself.
26
The court, after dismissing a count alleging general negligence, sustained the second count in which it was alleged that the defendant
wrongfully and illegally made an excavation in the highway.2 The court
found this theory to be one upon which a viable cause of action could
be founded and reasoned:
This [count] discloses a special injury inflicted on plaintiff
by a common and public nuisance created, not by this defendant's
neglect of or negligence in performing a public duty, but by its
active wrongdoing.
There is no reason arising out of public policy why municipal
corporations should be shielded from liability when a private inby their wrongful acts, as distinguished from mere
jury is inflicted
8
negligence. 2
23 46 N.J.L. 157 (Ct. Err. & App. 1884).
24 Id. at 160. Although this court adopted the Devon and Mower reasoning, it did
not cite either of these cases. Rather it relied on Hayes v. City of Oshkosh, 33 Wis. 314
(1873), reasoning as follows:
[T]hat the corporation is engaged in the performance of a public service in which
it has no particular interest and from which it derives no special benefit or
advantage in its corporate capacity, but which it is bound to see performed in
pursuance of a duty imposed by law for the general welfare of the inhabitants
and the community ....
46 N.J.L. at 160. Weintraub & Conford, supra note 21, at 142-43, called this reasoning the
"true principle."
In addition, the court pointed out that to hold the municipality responsible the
doctrine of respondeat superior would have to be applied and to do this "would indirectly fix upon the corporation a liability from which it is by law, on considerations of
public policy, exempted." 46 N.J.L. at 161. This dictum subsequently became a stumbling
block to the expansion of municipal immunity. See text at 422-23 and accompanying
notes infra.
25 57 N.J.L. 90, 29 A. 490 (Sup. Ct. 1894).
26 Id. at 91, 29 A. at 490. This count was dismissed based on the exemption of
municipal corporations from liability "on the ground of ancient precedent and public
policy." Id. at 92, 29 A. at 490-91.
27 Id., 29 A. at 491.
28 Id. at 92-93, 29 A. at 491.
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The exception created by this case, known as the doctrine of "active
wrongdoing," became one of the most prolific exceptions to the general
2
rule of municipal immunity.
In order for the exception to become operative, there must be some
positive act of commission rather than mere failure to act or omission.3 0
However, it is not necessary that the wrongful action be
the most proximate or nearest in time in a sequence of causes to the
injury sustained; it is sufficient if, in the sequence, there is such an
affirmative wrongful act even though the cause nearest in the
succession of causes may be a mere omission to act.8 '
In other words, the affirmative act on the part of the municipality may
occur prior to the nonactive negligence3 2 and need not to be of a tortious nature at all.3 3 It is the total sequence of acts that constitutes the
active wrongdoing.8 4
29 Caporossi v. Atlantic City, 220 F. Supp. 508 (D.N.J. 1963) (personal injury action
based on exposed pipe maintained on public beach owned by municipality); Hayden v.
Curley, 34 N.J. 420, 169 A.2d 809 (1961) (action based on defect in a public sidewalk);
McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960) (action by minor for injuries
sustained when struck by a bullet fired by a police officer); Hartman v. City of Brigantine,
23 N.J. 530, 129 A.2d 876 (1957) (wrongful death occasioned when decedent's truck struck
dirt piles on roadway); Cloyes v. Delaware Township, 23 N.J. 324, 129 A.2d 1 (1957) (action
for wrongful death of infant who drowned in open sedimentation tank of defendant
municipality); Kress v. City of Newark, 8 N.J. 562, 86 A.2d 185 (1952) (action for damages
from over-exposure to x-ray radiation in city hospital); Milstrey v. City of Hackensack, 6
N.J. 400, 79 A.2d 37 (1951) (personal injury action resulting from fall on municipal sidewalk); Robinson v. Ocean Township, 123 N.J.L. 525, 9 A.2d 300 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939)
(open concrete gutter was struck by auto causing physical harm to the driver and
passenger); Allas v. Borough of Rumson, 115 N.J.L. 593, 181 A. 175 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935)
(municipality sued for injuries sustained by plaintiff when she fell from a ramp constructed without guard rails); Casey v. Bridgewater Township, 107 N.J.L. 163, 151 A. 603
(Ct. Err. & App. 1930) (plaintiff suffered injuries when an improperly graded gravel pit
collapsed upon him); Ennever v. Borough of Bergenfield, 105 N.J.L. 419, 144 A. 809 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1929) (action for damages to plaintiff's property caused by municipality's
negligent construction and operation of sewerage disposal plant); Callan v. City of
Passaic, 104 N.J.L. 643, 141 A. 778 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928) (wrongful death action arising
from city's failure to properly guard a catch-basin); Farkas v. Middlesex Bd. of Freeholders,
49 N.J. Super. 363, 139 A.2d 779 (App. Div. 1958) (action for damages occasioned by the
alleged negligent repair of a roadway).
80 Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 84-86, 222 A.2d 649, 650-51 (1966) (action against
municipality arising out of intersectional collision); Hayden v. Curley, 34 N.J. 420, 425-26,
169 A.2d 809, 812 (1961); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 181, 162 A.2d 820, 825
(1960).
31 McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 181, 162 A.2d 820, 825 (1960).
32 Hayden v. Curley, 34 N.J. 420, 425-26, 169 A.2d .809, 812 (1961); Alias v. Borough
of Rumson, 115 N.J.L. 593, 596-97, 181 A. 175, 177 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935).
33 Hayden v. Curley, 34 N.J. 420, 425-26, 169 A.2d 809, 812 (1961).
34 Id. at 426, 169 A.2d at 812.
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In Hayden v. Curley,8 5 a leading case in New Jersey on active
wrongdoing, the plaintiff was injured when he tripped over a section
of the sidewalk which had been uplifted by a root. The tree from which
it had grown had been planted 18 years earlier by the defendant city's
Shade Tree Commission at the defendant homeowner's request. In ruling on the city's liability, the supreme court held that the positive act
of planting the tree coupled with the municipality's subsequent failure
to act (by inspecting the sidewalk) created a jury question as to whether
the city was negligent. 6
It is readily apparent that active negligence greatly expanded the
area of municipal liability. However, the expansion was limited by one
important restraint-the doctrine of respondeat superior was not applied. In order to hold the municipality liable, therefore, it was necessary to show that some ranking official of the township with power to
remedy the situation had knowledge of the tort. 7 This requirement

presented a difficult problem of proof since a plaintiff had to show
either that the act was ordered by a responsible municipal officer, or
that the municipality had constructively participated in the act by
failing to remedy it after being notified of its existence. 8
In 1960, the supreme court rectified this situation by ruling that

the doctrine of respondeat superior would be applied to municipal
corporations. In McAndrew v. Mularchuk,89 the plaintiff was shot while
involved in an altercation with a reserve police officer. He alleged that
85 34 N.J. 420, 169 A.2d 809 (1961).
86 Id. at 427-28, 169 A.2d at 813.
87 McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 182, 162 A.2d 820, 826 (1960); Kelley v.

Curtiss, 29 N.J. Super. 291, 298-99, 102 A.2d 471, 474-75 (App. Div. 1954). The origin of
this rule was Condict v. Jersey City, 46 N.J.L. 157, 160-61 (Ct. Err. & App. 1884). For a
discussion of the Condict case, see Weintraub & Conford, supra note 21, at 151-52. See also
Note, Respondeat Superior: An Inroad Upon Governmental Immunity, 15 RUTGERs L. REv.
98, 103 (1960).
88 The general rule is stated in Kelley v. Curtiss, 29 N.J. Super. 291, 102 A.2d 471
(App. Div. 1954):
[A] municipality has notice of a matter such as this, where notice is given to
some officer intrusted with a general authority to remedy the matter....
Furthermore, a municipality is chargeable with notice of such facts as this
officer would have discovered with the exercise of ordinary diligence in the performance of his duties....
So, if a municipal officer, entrusted with a general authority in the premises,
would have, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, discovered active wrongdoing
on the part of an employee or inferior officer, the municipality is charged with
notice of it. Furthermore, if in such a case he does not take reasonable measures
to prevent a continuance of the wrongdoing, then the municipality will have
participated in its continuance.
Id. at 299-301, 102 A.2d at 475-77. See also Tomlin v. Hildreth, 65 N.J.L. 438, 441, 47 A.
649, 650 (Sup Ct. 1900).
89 38 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960).
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the municipality was negligent in equipping such an officer with a
dangerous instrument without properly training him. Under the rule
as originally set forth in Condict, the plaintiff would have been compelled to prove participation by the municipality in the tort or knowledge of the dangerous condition. The court held, however, that such
a rule was
so artificial and unjust that it constantly sends the courts in particular cases on a deep and liberal search through the facts to find
some higher echelon employee who may be said to have participated in the negligent act of commission of the lower level
employee. 40
Thus, where the municipality is guilty of negligent acts of commission,
the general doctrine of respondeat superior will be applied.
The second, and perhaps most important exception to municipal
immunity arose as a natural corollary to the reasoning which had originally lead to the formation of the Condict rationale. As previously
mentioned, early decisions had concluded that it was unfair to hold a
municipality responsible for acts which it was under a duty to perform
and from which it gained no benefit. 41 Hence, when a situation arose
wherein the injury resulted from an activity which the municipality
was under no duty to perform, courts were forced to concede that
the town could be held responsible. 42 This position was first stated as
dictum in Tomlin v. Hildreth43 and later incorporated into the law
in New Jersey by Karpenski v. Borough of South River.44 The "governmental-proprietary" test, as it has come to be known, provides that where
a municipal corporation engages in an activity of a proprietary or
corporate nature in which it "voluntarily assume[s]-powers intended
for the private advantage and benefit of the locality and its inhabitants" 45 it will be held responsible for the torts committed in the
40 Id. at 192, 162 A.2d at 831.
41 See notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
42 The first prominent case in the United States to recognize the governmentalproprietary distinction was Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531, 539 (Sup. Ct. 1842). See
JAMES, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 29.6, at 1620 (1956).
43 65 N.J.L. 438, 47 A. 649 (Sup. Ct. 1900). The court stated:

2 F. HARPER &F.

[An officer elected or appointed by a municipal corporation . . . to perform a
public service in which the corporation has no private interest and from which
it derives no special benefit or advantage in its corporate capacity, cannot be
regarded as the servant or agent of the municipality for whose negligence or want
of skill it can be held liable.
Id. at 441, 47 A. at 650 (emphasis added).
44 83 N.J.L. 149, 83 A. 639 (Sup. Ct. 1912).
45 City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 127 (1884). See 18 E. McQUILLIN,
supra note 2, § 53.23, at 165.
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furtherance of these activities in the same way as any private corpora4
tion. 6
The most immediate problem arising from this exception is the
determination of which municipal activities are to be considered
governmental and which proprietary. Generally, when the municipality
is carrying out responsibilities of the state, such as making and enforcing
police regulations, preventing crime, preserving the public health,
providing fire protection, caring for the poor and educating the young,
47
it is exempted from responsibility for its tortious conduct.
In Fahey v. Jersey City, 48 Justice Schettino, in deciding whether
the maintenance of a park was proprietary or governmental, considered
significant
the fact that an activity was historically engaged in by a local
government; that it is uniformly so furnished today; that it could
not be performed as well by a private corporation; that it is not
undertaken for profit or for revenue; and, most significantly, that
it is within the imperative
public duties imposed on a municipality
49
as agent of the State.
Applying these standards, the court found that the operation of a
public park was governmental in nature. 50
As a rule, the New Jersey courts have looked with favor upon the
plaintiff's contention that the activity is proprietary in nature.51 As a
result the list of activities which have been held to be proprietary is
52
long.
46 Weintraub & Conford, supra note 21, state the rationale for this as follows:

[-here a municipality embarks upon a venture from which it derives some
special benefit or advantage in its corporate capacity, it is liable as fully and
completely as any private individual similarly engaged.
Id. at 144. See 18 E. McQuLLIN, supra note 2, § 53.30, at 196-97.
47 18 E. McQuuLIN, supra note 2, § 53.30, at 196.
48 52 N.J. 103, 244 A.2d 97 (1968).
49 Id. at 108-09, 244 A.2d at 100.
50 Id. at 109, 244 A.2d at 100.
51 Stringfield v. City of Hackensack, 68 N.J. Super 38, 171 A.2d 361 (App. Div. 1961),
wherein it was stated:
The understandable judicial reluctance to deprive, under modern-day conditions,
an injured party of recovery for personal injuries on the sole basis of sovereign
immunity has led to a whittling down of the immunity, in part by means of "a
more lenient attitude toward the proprietary classification."
Id. at 43, 171 A.2d at 364 (quoting from Schwartz v. Stockton, 32 N.J. 141, 147, 160 A.2d
1, 4 (1960)).
52 Cases holding specific municipal actions to be proprietary include: Caporossi v.
Atlantic City, 220 F. Supp. 508 (D.N.J. 1963) (maintenance of a public bathing beach);
Leemon v. South Jersey Port Comm'n, 145 F. Supp. 828 (D.N.J. 1956) (operation of a pier);
Goldberg v. Housing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962) (local housing authority);
Cloyes v. Delaware Township, 23 N.J. 324, 129 A.2d 1 (1957) (operation of sewage system);
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Although New Jersey has changed its basic approach to municipal
immunity53 the governmental-proprietary test continues to be applied
to statutorily granted immunity. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:20-3554 and
40:9-251 provide school districts and municipalities respectively with
immunity from liability for any injuries resulting from the use of any
public grounds, buildings or structures. In interpreting N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:9-2 in Fahey, it was concluded that the governmental-proprietary
test was still to be used in the application of that statute. 56 By implication, it would appear that the same rule would also be applicable
to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:20-35.
Although retaining the governmental-proprietary test for the
purposes of these two statutes, New Jersey courts have refused to
apply the active wrongdoing exception to both section 40:9-257 and
section 18A:20-35 58 on the grounds that "[t]he language is broad and
all inclusive and nothing is left to implication."5 9 Denying this exception seems somewhat incongruous in light of the fact that the
Fay v. City of Trenton, 126 N.J.L. 52, 18 A.2d 66 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941) (operation of water
department); Martin v. City of Asbury Park, 111 N.J.L. 364, 168 A. 612 (Ct. Err. & App.
1933) (operation of bathing pavilion); Stringfield v. City of Hackensack, 68 N.J. Super. 38, 171
A.2d 361 (App. Div. 1961) (parking lot); Weeks v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. Super. 166,
162 A.2d 314 (App. Div. 1960), af'd, 34 N.J. 250, 168 A.2d 11 (1961) (operation of swimming
pool); Karpenski v. Borough of South River, 83 N.J.L. 149, 83 A. 639 (Sup. Ct. 1912)
(operation of a lighting plant).
Cases holding specific municipal actions not to be proprietary include: Schwartz v.
Stockton, 32 N.J. 141, 160 A.2d 1 (1960) (maintenance of volunteer fire house); Kress v.
City of Newark, 8 N.J. 562, 86 A.2d 185 (1952) (operation of a hospital for indigents); Boyle
v. County of Hudson, 8 N.J. 294, 85 A.2d 269 (1951) (operation of a county penitentiary);
Truhlar v. Borough of East Paterson, 4 N.J. 490, 73 A.2d 163 (1950) (designing and
building streets); Vickers v. City of Camden, 122 N.J.L. 14, 3 A.2d 613 (Ct. Err. & App.
1939) (erection and maintenance of traffic light); Lanni v. City of Bayonne, 7 N.J. Super.
169, 72 A.2d 397 (App. Div. 1950) (enforcement of ordinance).
53 See notes 84 and 88 infra and accompanying text.
54 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:20-35 (1968) provides:
No school district shall be liable for injury to the person from the use of
any public grounds, buildings or structures, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.
55 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:9-2 (1967) provides:
No municipality or county shall be liable for injury to the person from the
use of any public grounds, buildings or structures, any law to the contrary
notwithstanding.
56 52 N.J. at 108, 244 A.2d at 99. The Fahey court further held:
Thus, despite the dissatisfaction with the artificial governmental-proprietary distinction which this and other courts have expressed on so many occasions, the test
must be retained for purposes of R.S. 40:9-2.
Id. at 108, 244 A.2d at 99.
67 Zapf v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, Middlesex County, 87 N.J. Super. 426, 428,
209 A.2d 660, 661 (App. Div. 1965).
58 Thompson v. Board of Educ., 11 N.J. 207, 210, 94 A.2d 206, 207 (1953).
69 Id.
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supreme court could find that the governmental-proprietary test would
be applied even though the statute does not specifically encompass
that exception.
MODERN

THEORIES OF GOVERNMENTAL

IMMUNITY:

DISCRETIONARY-MINISTERIAL TEST

Although the modem trend in municipal immunity and sovereign immunity is toward greater tort responsibility for governmental
0 there still exists some areas of governmental activity which
units,6
almost everyone recognizes should remain protected. 61 The problem,
of course, is to determine just what activities the government is to
be responsible for.
The modern response to this problem has been the advent of
the "discretionary function" test. This test developed to a large extent
from section 2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946,62 which
was enacted as a result of "a feeling that the Government should assume the obligation to pay damages for the misfeasance of employees
in carrying out its work."6 3 Included within the Act are 13 specific
exceptions to liability, two of which are of major importance. 64 The
first is the immunity of the federal government for intentional torts of
its agents.6 5 The other, and more pertinent exception, is section 2680(a)
which provides immunity for
(a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid,
or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
60 See Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1957); Molitor v.
Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 Ill. 2d 11, 14-15, 163 N.E.2d 89, 90 (1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 968 (1960); Willis v. Department of Cons. & Ec. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 538, 264 A.2d
34, 36 (1970); Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 33-36, 115 N.W.2d 618, 621-23
(1962). See also K. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 25.00, at 823-44.
61 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE, § 25.11, at 482, 485 (1958); Borchard,
supra note 2, at 240.
62 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a) (1965).
63 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953).
64 3 K. DAVIS, supra note 61, § 25.08, at 469 states:
The limited or minor exceptions relate to postal matter, collection of taxes and
customs duties, admiralty, Trading with the Enemy Act, quarantines, vessels
passing through the Panama Canal or in Canal Zone waters, fiscal operations of
the Treasury or regulation of the monetary system, combatant activities during
wartime, claims arising in a foreign country, activities of the Tennessee Valley
Authority, and activities of the Panama Railroad Company.
65 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(h) (1965).
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agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.
The Supreme Court interpreted this section of the Act in the
case of Dalehite v. United States.66 The claim against the government
arose out of the famous Texas City, Texas disaster of 1947 in which
560 people were killed and 3,000 injured when a freighter being loaded
with fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate exploded in the harbor, leveling much of that city.6 7 The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of
the federal officials who were involved in the production and control
of the explosive material because it was being produced as part of the
foreign aid program. The district court found negligence in the bagging,
labeling and coating of the material.6 8 The Supreme Court, however,
ruled that the government's involvement with respect to these acts was
protected as discretionary within the meaning of section 2680(a). 69
Concerning the meaning of discretion, the Court stated:
The "discretion" protected by the section is not that of the judgea power to decide within the limits of positive rules of law subject
to judicial review. It is the discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's judgment of the best
course ....
[T]he "discretionary function or duty" that cannot form a basis
for suit under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of programs and activities. It also includes determinations
made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. Where there is room for policy
judgment and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows
that acts of subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable. 70
The Court further attempted to clarify the distinction by stating that
decisions made at the "planning level" rather than the "operational
71
level" were immune.
66 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
67 Id. at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 39-40.
69 Id. at 17-45.
70 Id. at 34-36 (footnotes omitted).
71 Id. at 42. Justice Jackson in his dissenting opinion expressed some incredulity with
respect to the majority's findings concerning the "high level" nature of the allegedly
negligent decisions:
[I]f decisions are being made at Cabinet levels as to the temperature of bagging
explosive fertilizers, whether paper is suitable for bagging hot fertilizer, and how
the bags should be labeled, perhaps an increased sense of caution and responsibility even at that height would be wholesome. The common sense of this matter
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The decision in Dalehite was somewhat limited, and a more
inclusive interpretation was given to the government's liability by
Indian Towing Co. v. United States,72 wherein it was held that the
government could be liable for the negligent maintenance by the Coast
Guard of a lighthouse.78 The Court rejected the defendant's contention
that the Act provided the government with immunity when it was performing actions which private individuals could not perform, 74 stating
that such a position "would thus push the courts into the 'non-governmental'-'govermental' quagmire that has long plagued the law of
75
municipal corporations."
is that a policy adopted in the exercise of an immune discretion was carried out
carelessly by those in charge of detail.
Id. at 58. He went on to expound what has come to be the more accepted view toward
discretionary functions:
But many acts of government officials deal only with the housekeeping side
of federal activities. The Government, as landowner, as manufacturer, as shipper,
as warehouseman, as shipowner and operator, is carrying on activities indistinguishable from those performed by private persons. In this area, there is no
good reason to stretch the legislative text to immunize the Government or its
officers from responsibility for their acts, if done without appropriate care for
thesafety of others. Many official decisions even in this area may involve a nice
balancing of various considerations, but this is the same kind of balancing which
citizens do at their peril and we think it is not within the exception of the statute.
Id. at 60. See Fair v. United States, 234 F.2d 288, 292 (5th Cir. 1956).
72 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
78 Id.
at 69. 3 K. DAvis, supra note 61, § 25.09, at 473-74, § 25.10, at 478; The
Supreme Court, 1955 Term, 70 HARv. L. REV.83, 136-37 (1956).
74 The government in Indian Towing had relied on the Dalehite conclusion that
§ 2680 of the Tort Claims Act demonstrated that Congress had "exercised care to protect
the Government from claims, however negligently caused, that affected the governmental
function." 346 U.S. at 32.
75 350 US. at 65. In synthesizing the Dalehite and Indian Towing cases, Professor
Davis set down ten guiding principles concerning discretionary functions:
1. The government probably is not liable for negligence in planning "at a
planning rather than operational level."
2. The statutory concept of "a discretionary function," with respect to which
the government is not liable whether or not the discretion involved be abused,
probably is limited to the planning level and probably does not include functions
at the operational level even if those functions involved discretion.
3. The location of the line between the planning and operational levels is yet
to be worked out, but the government is probably immune from liability for
negligence in "a plan developed at a high level under a direct delegation of plan,
making authority from the apex of the Executive Department."
4. The line between the planning and operational levels may depend not
merely upon the position of the actor in the government hierarchy but may
depend in part on whether the negligence is "in policy decisions of a regulatory
or governmental nature" or whether the negligence relates to "actions akin to
those of a private manufacturer, contractor, or shipper."
5. "When an official exerts governmental authority in a manner which legally
binds one or many," the government probably is not liable.
6. The test of government liability does not depend upon the governmental.
proprietary distinction. The government may be liable for negligence at the
operational level, even if the function performed is governmental.
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The "discretionary-ministerial" or "planning-operation approach"
to immunity has not been received with unanimous support. Probably
the most persuasive criticism of the doctrine, as it is interpreted under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, is that it allows too much protection for
governmental acts because courts have tended "to emphasize the
literal meaning of the term 'discretionary,' along with [the assumption]
that anything in the nature of 'planning' calls for immunity . . . 76
A recent California Supreme Court case recognized this criticism and proposed a solution. In Johnson v. State,77 the plaintiff
brought an action alleging that the Youth Authority of California had
negligently placed a 16-year-old foster child in her home without revealing his homicidal tendencies or his background of violence and
cruelty to humans and animals. Plaintiff brought the action after suffering injuries when the boy assaulted her with a butcher knife. 78 The
court, in interpreting a California statute79 simlar to the Federal Tort
Claims Act, refused to assign a literal definition to the term "discretionary," stating:
We follow equally sound precedent, however, in rejecting the
state's invitation to enmesh ourselves deeply in the semantic thicket
of attempting to determine, as a purely literal matter, "where the
ministerial and imperative duties end and the discretionary powers
7. Negligence in regulating or in failing to regulate through resort to legislative power probably does not subject the government to liability.
8. Absolute liability without fault does not arise even if the government
handles an inherently dangerous commodity or engages in an extra-hazardous
activity.
9. The government may be liable for negligence in performing a function
even if the function has no counterpart in the activities of private persons.
10. The government may be liable for negligence in performing a service
which neither the government nor the agency nor the officers have an obligation to
undertake.
3 K. DAvis, supra note 61, § 25.10, at 479-82 (footnotes omitted).
76 K. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 25.08, at 846; see F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 42,
§ 29.15, at 1663-664.
Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion in Dalehite, expressed a similar point of
view, reasoning:
Surely a statute so long debated was meant to embrace more than traffic accidents.
If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine that "The King can do no wrong"
has not been uprooted; it has merely been amended to read, "The King can do
only little wrongs."
346 U.S. at 60.
77 69 Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
78 Id. at 785, 447 P.2d at 354, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
79 CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 820.2 (West 1966) states:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for
an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the
result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.
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begin. *** "[I]t would be difficult to conceive of any official act,
no matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only
the driving of a nail." 8 0
Rather the court limited its holding to the rule that the state would be
immune for only "basic policy decisions.""' It further stated that, while
the Youth Authority may make certain protected discretionary decisions
concerning the placing of children,8 2 it is the duty of the Authority, once
the decision is made, to warn the foster parents of any potentially
dangerous abnormalities in the child's history. s°
Although the Johnson decision certainly serves to mute any judicial
4
trend expanding immunity under the cloak of discretionary functions,
it is questionable whether the term "basic policy decision" will provide
any better guidelines for other courts than will the terms "discretionary80 69 Cal. 2d 782, 788, 447 P.2d 352, 357, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 245 (quoting from Ham
v. County of Los Angeles, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468 (1920)).
81 69 Cal. 2d at 793, 447 P.2d at 360, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248. The court recognized
that its solution was not dispositive of the problem. It stated:
We recognize that this interpretation of the term "discretionary" presents some
difficulties. For example, problems arise in attempting to translate this concern
for the court's role in the governmental structure into an applicable touchstone for
decision. Our proposed distinction, sometimes described as that between the
"planning" and "operational" levels of decision-making.., however, offers some
basic guideposts, although it certainly presents no panacea. Admittedly, our
interpretation will necessitate delicate decisions; the very process of ascertaining
whether an official determination rises to the level of insulation from judicial
review requires sensitivity to the considerations that enter into it and an appreciation of the limitations on the court's ability to reexamine it. Despite these
potential drawbacks, however, our approach possesses the dispositive virtue of
concentrating on the reasons for granting immunity to the governmental entity.
It requires us to find and isolate those areas of quasi-legislative policy-making
which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts will not
entertain a tort action alleging that careless conduct contributed to the governmental decision.
Id. at 794, 447 P.2d 360-61, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
82 Whether parole is to be granted is a protected discretionary decision. Id. at 795,
447 P.2d at 361, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
83 Once an official reaches the decision to parole . . . the determination as to
whether to warn the foster parents of latent dangers facing them presents no such
reasons for immunity; to the extent that a parole officer consciously considers pros
and cons in deciding what information, if any, should be given, he makes such
a determination at the lowest, ministerial rung of official action.
Id. at 795-96, 447 P.2d at 362, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
Another problem which the court raised was the issue of whether the existence of a
primary policy decision would clothe a subsequent ministerial decision made to implement the primary one with immunity. While rejecting such a holding for the case at bar,
it left the final resolution of that question for a later determination, pointing out, however,
that most of these situations "involve failures to warn of foreseeable, latent dangers flowing from the basic, immune decision." Id. (footnote omitted).
84 K. DAvis, supra note 3, § 25.08, at 846-48.
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ministerial" or "planning-operational." What is needed is not new
terminology but a uniform judicial determination that immunity is to
be strictly limited.
MODERN NEW JERSEY LAW

Such a judicial determination was made by the New Jersey Supreme
Court in the case of B. W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York8 5 where
the court stated "that most of the reasons for immunity have expired and
that municipal liability should be subject to less restrictive limits."8 6
The court further ruled that the new theory should be allowed to
"metamorphize slowly" 8 7 on a case-by-case basis, with each case approached not by "asking why immunity should not apply in a given
situation but rather .
88

[by] asking whether there is any reason why

it should apply."
While B. W. King directed that a new approach be taken to immunity, it did not completely abrogate it. Rather, it specifically recognized that there were certain municipal actions, "regardless of how defined and tested, [which] should continue to be immune from tort
liability."8 9 To illustrate this the court cited four cases: 90 Amelchenko
93
v. Borough of Freehold,91 Fitzgerald v. Palmer,92 Hoy v. Capelli,
94
and Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park. From these can be
distilled the parameters within which municipal immunity in New
Jersey is now limited.
In Amelchenko the issue before the court was the liability of a
municipality to a person injured from a fall on the unplowed snow of
one of its parking lots, 33 hours after the snowfall had ended. The
supreme court, ignoring the parties' and the lower court's discussion
of the governmental-proprietary test,95 ruled that the Township was
under a duty to remove the snow only within a reasonable time.96
However, an inquiry into a breach of that duty must be limited strictly
85 49 N.J. 318, 230 A.2d 133 (1967).

86 Id. at 324, 230 A.2d at 136.
87 Id. at 325, 230 A.2d at 137.
88 Id.

89 Id. at 324-25, 230 A.2d at 137.
90 Id. at 325, 230 A.2d at 137.
91 42 N.J. 541, 201 A.2d 726 (1964).
92 47 N.J. 106, 219 A.2d 512 (1966).
93 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966).
94 48 N.J. 214, 225 A.2d 105 (1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967).
95 42 N.J. at 546, 201 A.2d at 729.
96 Id. at 551, 554, 201 A.2d at 731, 733.
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to the question of whether the Township varied from its established
practices and procedures in dealing with the storm. Inquiry may not
be made into the question of whether certain discretionary decisions
were correctly formulated. The court was concerned with two specific
areas of decision-making. The first of these related to the policy-making
process of the town governing body, wherein it decides what problems
will face the town and how the town will respond to them. 97 An example
of this would be a decision to allocate a certain amount of money for
men and equipment to deal with snowstorms. While this amount may
be grossly inadequate to alleviate that problem and, as a result, an
injury occurs, this determination is, nevertheless,
a matter of judgment committed under our system of government
to the local authority and it should not be interfered with by the
courts in a tort damage suit. 98
The court apparently felt constrained to allow the governing unit to
carry out its function without the bridling effect of a potential lawsuit
delving into the intricacies of the governmental process through the
99
"Monday morning quarterbacking" of a jury.
The second area of decision-making is derivative of the first. It
concerns the method by which the administrative arm implements the
general policy determinations of the governing body. Included thereunder are decisions prescribing when, where, how and in what order the
men and equipment will be utilized. 100 For example, if a plan were
developed by a major administrative officer detailing which streets were
to be plowed and in what order, that plan would not be reviewable
in a tort suit. Such decisions are rightly within the province of those
who are politically responsible for them, and not a jury. The court
stated that the quality of service provided is strictly a political decision
and that public officials must be free to face this decision without fear
of tort liability for themselves or their town.10 ' The basic theory underId. at 550, 201 A.2d at 730-31.
98 Id. at 549, 201 A.2d at 730.
99 Id. at 550, 201 A.2d at 731. Justice Francis, writing for the court, reasoned that
the priorities to be given in clearing of streets, the quantum of equipment to be purchased,
and the number of men to be hired "represents the exercise of judgment on a governmental
matter .... [and a] jury cannot be allowed to substitute its decision for that of the municipality." Id. at 555, 201 A.2d at 733.
100 42 N.J. at 550, 201 A.2d at 730-31. Justice Francis noted that to allow such
decisions to be reviewed in a tort suit "would take the ultimate decision-making authority
away from those who are responsible politically for making the decisions." Id. at 550, 201
A.2d at 730.
101 Id. at 550, 201 A.2d at 730-31.
97
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lying this rationale is summed up in Justice Francis' statement: "It
102
cannot be a tort for government to govern."'
In Fitzgerald and Hoy, two other cases cited as guidelines in
B. W. King, the plaintiffs complained that the governing bodies had
not sufficiently exercised their governmental prerogatives. The plaintiff
in Fitzgerald alleged that her decedent was injured when vandals
pushed a 60-pound slab of concrete onto his car from a recently built
overpass. She contended that the state was negligent in failing to provide protective fences on the overpass, 1 3 but the court rejected this,
stating:
A private entrepreneur may readily be held for negligent
omissions within the chosen ambit of his activity. But the area
within which government has the power to act for the public good
is almost without limit, and the State has no duty to do everything
that might be done. Rather there is a political discretion as to what
ought to be done, as to priorities, and as to how much should be
raised by taxes or borrowed to that end. If government does act,
then, when it acts in a manner short of ordinary prudence, liability
could be judged as in the case of a private party. So if a road were
constructed of a design imperiling the user, the issue of fault would
present no novel problem. But whether a road should have four
or six or eight lanes, or there should be dividers, or circles or jughandles for turns, or traffic lights, or traffic policemen, or a speed
limit of 50 or 60 miles per hour-such matters involve discretion
and revenue and are committed to the judgment of the legislative
and executive branches. As to such matters, the question is whether
a judge or jury could review the policy or political decisions involved without in effect taking over the responsibility and power
104
of those other branches.

102 Id. at 550, 201 A.2d at 731. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 57 (1953);
K. DAVIS, supra note 3, § 25.08, at 847.
103 47 N.J. at 108, 219 A.2d at 513.
104 Id. at 109-10, 219 A.2d at 514. Since this action was against the state, the court
was faced with the problem of separation of powers. On that point the court reasoned:
Mhe State's "immunity" involves ultimately the question, which branch of
government shall decide for the State when it shall pay? In the abstract, a question
of that kind would seem "judicial" enough in the absence of a controlling policy
expression by the Legislature. But the judiciary could not enforce a judgment if
it gave one. No money may be drawn from the State treasury but for appropriations made by law. Const., Art. VIII, § II,
2. The judiciary could not order the
Legislature to appropriate money, or the Governor to approve an appropriation if
one were made ....
Nor would it do to issue a writ of execution to sell the State
House or the courtroom furnishings ....
Thus the problem arises from the circumstance that under our system of separation of powers, the judiciary, not
controlling the purse strings, cannot act effectively alone.
Id. at 108, 219 A.2d at 513. This problem does not arise, however, when the alleged tort
is committed by a municipality because the municipalities are not coequal bodies to the
courts.
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Once again, the court was interested in protecting the governing body,
in this case the state, from investigation by an inexpert group unattuned
to the technical or political subleties to which the legislative and administrative branches are exposed.
In Hoy, the plaintiff was injured in an accident at an intersection
formerly controlled by a traffic light. The light had been removed
two month prior to the accident. The plaintiff claimed that the municipality negligently failed to replace the signal after removing it. 0 The
supreme court rejected this contention of active wrongdoing, however,
and framed the issue of the case along the same lines as in Amelchenko,
namely,
whether there are certain kinds of acts or omissions of
government, no matter how they are categorized, defined or labelled
or how governmental immunity from suit is to be regarded, which
should not give rise to tort liability. 106
The court concluded that there were certain "discretionary" functions
which must necessarily be considered immune from tort liability. Additionally, it decided that a governmental determination to install
or not to install a traffic light would be considered a "discretionary"
function.1 07 This position is consistent with Amelchenko and, in fact,
seems mandatory in light of the Fitzgerald decision. 08
105 48 N.J. at 84, 222 A.2d at 650.
106 Id. at 87, 222 A.2d at 652.
107 Id. at 91, 222 A.2d at 654-55.
Both the Hoy and Amelchenko decisions were based to a large extent on the reasoning
expressed by Judge Fuld in the New York Court of Appeals case of Weis v. Fote, 7 N.Y.2d
579, 167 N.E.2d 63, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1960). The plaintiff claimed she was injured because
the city of Buffalo had allowed too short an interval between the red and green lights.
Judge Fuld, in determining that immunity must continue to exist in certain situations,
expressed the often quoted rationale justifying immunity for high-level policy decisions:
Lawfully authorized planning by governmental bodies has a unique character
deserving of special treatment as regards the extent to which it may give rise to
tort liability. It is proper and necessary to hold municipalities and the State
liable for injuries arising out of the day-by-day operations of government-for
instance, the garden variety injury resulting from the negligent maintenance of a
highway-but to submit to a jury the reasonableness of the lawfully authorized
deliberations of executive bodies presents a different question ....
To accept a
jury's verdict as to the reasonableness and safety of a plan of governmental
services and prefer it over the judgment of the governmental body which originally
considered and passed on the matter would be to obstruct normal governmental
operations and to place in inexpert hands what the Legislature has seen fit to
entrust to experts. Acceptance of this conclusion, far from effecting revival of the
ancient shibboleth that "the king can do no wrong", serves only to give expression
to the important and continuing need to preserve the pattern of distribution of
governmental functions prescribed by constitution and statute.
Id. at 585-86, 167 N.E.2d at 65-66, 20 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
108 In Fitzgerald, Chief Justice Weintraub stated that the decision as to whether a
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The Visidor case, while leading to the same conclusion as the other
three, had a slightly different factual pattern. The injury suffered by
the plaintiff was not directly inflicted by the municipality but emerged
as the indirect consequence of a legitimate governmental act. The
Visidor Corporation operated a tavern in the defendant municipality.
The latter had passed an ordinance declaring a street used by the
plaintiff's patrons to be one-way, which resulted in a loss of business
to the tavern. Subsequently, the plaintiff successfully challenged the
ordinance on procedural grounds' 09 and, in the same action, sought
money damages from the Borough for the business it had lost during
the time the street was illegally declared one-way. 110
Justice Jacobs, speaking for the court, stated that legislative actions
by governing bodies are immune from tort claims even when the act in
question is subsequently deemed to be invalid.'
Plaintiff's remedy
lay only in having the ordinance declared illegal." 2 This decision, the
court ruled,
serves to protect municipalities against endangering financial
demands and to permit their governing bodies to govern conscientiously for the public interest, as they find it, without the fears
and burdens of litigating such demands. 113
The court's decision would seem to fit neatly into the strictures
of immunity developed in the three earlier New Jersey decisions. A
determination by a city council that a certain street is to be declared
one-way is decidedly an action of a character to which liability should
not attach because it requires the balancing of many different public
interests. There is no real right or wrong determination. If the street
is not declared one-way then motorists would suffer a detriment, while
if it is declared one-way people in situations similar to the plaintiff's
would suffer a detriment. The governing body must weigh the two
conflicting harms and make a determination. It should not be held
responsible for making one decision when another group of individuals
road should have traffic lights was discretionary and committed to the judgment of the
legislative and executive branches. 47 N.J. at 110, 219 A.2d at 514.
109 48 N.J. at 216, 225 A.2d at 106.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 222, 225 A.2d at 109.
112 In Visidor the ordinance was voided because of the municipalities' failure to
comply with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-197 (1961), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-202 (1961),
which require approval from the Director of Motor Vehicles for such ordinances. 48 N.J. at
216, 225 A.2d at 109.
118 48 N.J. at 224, 25 A.2d at 110.
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(a jury) might come to a different conclusion based upon the same
14

facts.1

Of course, it should be pointed out that Visidor did not specifically
deny the above reasoning. Rather it contended that the tort committed
by the Borough was its failure to take the proper procedural steps in
enacting the ordinance. While technically the plaintiff might appear
to have a cause of action under the discetionary-ministerial test since
the procedural requirement would seem to be clearly ministerial, the
real harm resulted not from the Borough's procedural failure to
notify the state about its ordinance 1 5 but from the effect of the ordinance itself. Therefore, to allow the plaintiff to prevail on the grounds
of the procedural deficiencies would have been to overlook the substance of his complaint." 6
It would appear that the following guidelines can be postulated
117
concerning the present status of municipal immunity in New Jersey:
114 Perhaps under a more Utopian system every action by the government wherein
harm is done to an individual will be remedied. While at first blush this may seem
unlikely, it appears to be the direction of the law. Compare Mower v. Inhabitants of
Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812), with B. W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318,
230 A.2d 133 (1967), for a view of the radical change in judicial and social attitudes.
115 See note 111 supra.
116 The court justified its decision on this issue by pointing out that the judicial
trend was against recovery, that an expedient action by an aggrieved party could quickly
invalidate an improper ordinance, that the Board had acted in good faith, and finally, that
the purpose of the ordinance was not for the protection of economic interests but for
the advancement of traffic safety. The court balanced the above factors against the harm
done to the plaintiff and ruled that the plaintiff's damage claim must fail. 48 N.J. at 223,
225 A.2d at 109-10.
117 In light of Willis v. Department of Cons. & Ec. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 264 A.2d 34
(1970), most of these guidelines would also apply to soverign immunity. In that case the
court stated that after January 1, 1971, the state could no longer rely on the defense of
sovereign immunity. The court stated:
It is time for the judiciary to accept a like responsibility and adjudicate the
tort liability of the State itself. For the reasons already given, we will not attempt
to express an ultimate doctrine; the constituent principles will be better evolved
out of the realities of specific cases. But we do emphasize that the State will not
be held liable for legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative action
or inaction of a legislative or judicial cast, nor generally with respect to decisions
calling for the exercise of official judgment or discretion. This limitation seems
to be uniformly accepted, as we pointed out in Hoy ... and Visidor ....
In those
cases, we invoke the same limitation with respect to the liability of municipal
corporations.
Id. at 540-41, 264 A.2d at 37.
Subsequent to Willis the New Jersey Legislature enacted N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4A-1
(Supp. 1971-72), which extended the date after which immunity was waived until July 1,
1971. In 1971 this date was changed to April 1, 1972. Law of June 2, 1971, ch. 187, [1971]
N.J. Laws 748. Recently, a bill was signed into law extending immunity to July 1, 1972.
Law of April 7, 1972, ch. 9, [1972] N.J. Laws -.
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I.

Municipal immunity is still a functioning doctrine in New
Jersey law, but its application is limited to those situations
wherein:
(A) The cause of the alleged wrong was an action of discretionary governmental quality on the part of the munici11 8

pality.

(1) A discretionary governmental action protected by
immunity exists where:
(a) the alleged wrong springs directly from some
policy decision on the part of the governing
board to take some action or not to take some
action; or,
(b) the alleged wrong is generated as the result of
the general plan set up by the governing board
or its administrative officer to carry out that
policy decision;1 19 or,
(c) an employee of the municipality, although not
an elected governing official, carries out actions
12 0
for the town which are of a legislative, judicial,
121
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial nature.
(B) A statute creates a specific zone of immunity in favor
122
of the municipality.
II. In all other cases where the tort results from a variation from
the municipal plan,'123 from the negligence of a municipal
servant or agent, or from a breach of duty on the part of the
township, 124 it will be held liable.
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court instituted rather
innovative standards in B. W. King and the cases cited therein, the
court chose to ignore them when the first opportunity for their
118 Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541, 549-50, 201 A.2d 726, 730-31
(1964); Bergen v. Koppenal, 97 N.J. Super. 265, 268, 235 A.2d 30, 31 (App. Div. 1967), aff'd,
52 N.J. 478, 246 A.2d 442 (1968).
119 Hoy v. Capeii, 48 N.J. 81, 87-91, 222 A.2d 649, 652-55 (1966); Fitzgerald v. Palmer,
47 N.J. 106, 108-10, 219 A.2d 512, 513-14 (1966); Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42
N.J. 541, 550-51, 201 A.2d 726, 730-31 (1964).
120 Willis v. Department of Cons. & Ec. Dev., 55 N.J. 534, 540, 264 A.2d 34, 37 (1970).
121 See Fiduccia v. Summit Hill Constr. Co., 109 N.J. Super. 249, 255, 262 A.2d 920, 923
(Essex County Dist. Ct. 1970).
122 Fahey v. City of Jersey City, 52 N.J. 103, 109, 244 A.2d 97, 100 (1968). In Fahey the
statute in question was N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:9-2 (1967).
123 B. W. King, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 49 N.J. 318, 325-26, 230 A.2d 133, 13738 (1967); Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541, 550, 201 A.2d 726, 731 (1964).
124 McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 35 N.J. 172, 184-85, 162 A.2d 820, 827 (1960).
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application arose. In Jackson v. Hankinson, the plaintiff sued the
Board of Education of the Borough of New Shrewsbury after he
was injured by an obstreperous fellow pupil while riding on a school
bus. The trial court had relieved the Board of liability on the grounds
of municipal immunity. 126 The appellate division remanded the case
for consideration of the issue of the active wrongdoing of the school
board. 1 27 On appeal, the supreme court, after recognizing the present

trend in municipal immunity, sidestepped the issue of active wrongdoing 128 and immunity in general'2 and based its reasoning on the duty
of care owed by the Board to the children in its charge. It stated:
It must be borne in mind that the relationship between the child
and the school authorities is not a voluntary one but is compelled
by law. The child must attend school ...

and is subject to school

rules and disciplines. In turn the school authorities are obligated
130
to take reasonable precautions for his safety and well-being.
By avoiding the issue of immunity, the court seems to have created
another exception to the immunity rule: where the municipality is
under a special duty of care imposed by statute. Whether the court
intended to create this exception or was simply interested in avoiding
the issue of*immunity so as to assure a remedy to the infant plaintiff
is not particularly clear from the decision, although the latter would
seem to be more likely because of the difficulty the court would have
faced if it had to determine whether the Board's approach to bus safety
was a protected decision."'3 It is also interesting to speculate as to
125 51 N.J. 230, 238 A.2d 685 (1968).

94 N.J. Super. 505, 508, 229 A.2d 267, 269 (App. Div. 1967).
Id. at 518, 229 A.2d at 274.
128 The court pointed out that the concept of active wrongdoing had never been expressly disavowed and stated:
We need not here pursue the question of whether the active wrongdoing
concept may still have vitality in other contexts for we are satisfied that, in any
event, it has none here.
51 N.J. at 235, 238 A.2d at 688.
It would appear, in light of B. W. King's abolition of the governmental-proprietary test, that the active wrongdoing concept has taken on a vestigial nature. That concept,
as was previously mentioned, is applied when the act complained of is said to be of a
governmental nature. Therefore, since B. W. King abolished the governmental-proprietary
test, there is no place in the law for it. It should be further pointed out that the one place
in New Jersey law where the governmental-proprietary test was applied-statutorily
granted immunity-the active wrongdoing concept was not applied. See notes 54-58 supra
and accompanying text.
129 51 N.J. at 235-36, 238 A.2d at 688.
180 Id. at 235, 238 A.2d at 688.
181 Since a school board is a local governmental unit, Botkin v. Borough of Westwood,
52 N.J. Super. 416, 425, 145 A.2d 618, 623 (App. Div. 1958), appeal dismissed, 28 N.J. 218,
146 A.2d 121 (1958), the reasoning of Amelchenko would be applicable to it. Therefore, the
126

127
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whether the same reasoning would have similarly applied to a prisoner
1 82
injured while in municipal custody.
The court could not as easily sidestep the immunity question
in A. & B. Auto Stores v. City of Newark. 3 3 In that case, the plaintiffs
had alleged that the defendant municipality was negligent with respect to its planning for, and response to, riots. Among other things,
the plaintiffs complained in the lower court that the defendant failed
to purchase the proper riot equipment and had deployed its manpower carelessly during the actual rioting.134 The supreme court rejected these contentions, stating that the plaintiffs had challenged "administrative or legislative decisions of a discretionary character"' 135 and
that these were within the purview of municipal immunity. It would
appear that the court could have made no other decision without be-

coming hopelessly enmeshed in the upper-echelon political and administrative decision-making processes of Newark.
In another case involving police discretion, Bergen v. Koppenal,136
the plaintiff was injured in a traffic accident which was allegedly caused
by a defective traffic light on a state highway. A municipal police officer,
while patrolling the state highway, had observed the condition and
reported it to his superiors. They, in turn, had notified state authorities,
but had failed to dispatch an officer to the scene to direct traffic. The
plaintiff contended this was negligence. The trial judge dismissed the
claim against the Township on the grounds that the municipality had
no control over the light, and that the decision as to whether to send a
court would have had to contend with the holding in Amelchenko that decisions concerning when, where, and in what order personnel and equipment are to be used are not
subject to review in tort suits. 42 N.J. at 550, 201 A.2d at 730-31.
132 See Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1969); Note, Tortious Conduct ol
Prison Officials-Application of the Civil Rights Act, 1 SETON HALL L. Riv. 243 (1970).
188 59 N.J. 5, 279 A.2d 693 (1971); see Manzo v. City of Plainfield, 59 N.J. 30, 279 A.2d
706 (1971), and R. L. Mulliken, Inc. v. City of Englewood, 59 N.J. 1, 279 A.2d 691 (1971),
which were related cases arising out of racial turmoil of the late 1960's.
184 106 N.J. Super. 491, 494, 256 A.2d 110, 111 (L. Div. 1969).
185 59 N.J. at 11, 279 A.2d at 696. The supreme court relied to a large extent on
Judge Lamer's trial decision that the actions taken by the City of Newark and its police
department were discretionary. He had noted that the municipality's decision whether to
purchase extraordinary riot equipment was a policy decision because it required taking
into account such factors as the tax ramifications, the effect of such a decision on the
community and whether the deployment of such equipment would have exacerbated the
problem. He further pointed out:
How is a fact finder to arrive at a determination of fault or cause and effect in
such nebulous areas as riot training or planning or community relations between
city officials and militant racial groups?
106 N.J. Super. at 499, 256 A.2d at 114.
136 97 N.J. Super. 265, 235 A.2d 30 (App. Div. 1967), afJ'd as modified, 52 N.J. 478, 246
A.2d 442 (1968).
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policeman was a discretionary and legislative function. 13 7 The appellate
division reversed, holding that the Township's decision not to send an
officer was not a discretionary function.1 38 The case was remanded to
the trial division to ascertain if the Township had acted reasonably and
89
had fulfilled its duty to the users of the highway.
The supreme court affirmed the appellate division's ruling that the
police action was not discretionary, but modified it,140 holding
that, while a duty may be imposed upon the police if notified of
emergency road conditions, the municipality may justify its actions by
showing that it did not act because of competing demands upon its
manpower. In such a case the jury would be instructed that they may
not disagree with the police judgment unless it was "palpably unreasonable."' 14 Thus the court appeared to graft another new exception
onto the municipal immunity doctrine. 1'
While at first the Bergen decision appears to be in conflict with the
decision in A. & B. Auto Stores, the two are actually in harmony. In
Bergen the alleged tort was a decision of individual policemen as to
how they would handle a specific problem. This is a ministerial action.143
On the other hand, in A. & B. Auto Stores the wrongs complained of
stemmed from the decisions as to what equipment to purchase, 44 clearly
a discretionary legislative determination, and how to deploy manpower
and equipment, clearly a high-level discretionary administrative de14 5
cision.
Of course a comparison of Bergen and A. & B. Auto Stores points
up a problem which will always face courts when deciding an immunity
question: where in the municipal decision-making process do decisions
become discretionary?
An examination of a recent lower court decision, Fiducciav. Summit Hill Construction Co., 4 illustrates the difficulties encountered in
dealing with this problem. In that case, the plaintiff sued the Borough
137 97 N.J. Super. at 268, 235 A.2d at 31. The trial court relied on the supreme court's
decision in Hoy.
138 Id. at 269, 235 A.2d at 32.
139 Id. at 269-70, 235 A.2d at 32.
140 52 N.J. 478, 480, 246 A.2d 442, 444 (1968).
141 Id.
142 It is interesting to speculate whether this umbrella of protection would have been
extended if private corporations performed this same type of activity or whether the
exception was granted as a result of the arcane nature of the work performed.
143 97 N.J. Super. at 269, 235 A.2d at 32; see Czyzewski v. Schwartz, 110 N.J. Super.
255, 261, 265 A.2d 173, 176 (App. Div. 1970).
144 106 N.J. Super. at 498, 256 A.2d at 114.
145 Id. at 499, 256 A.2d at 114.
146 109 N.J. Super. 249, 262 A.2d 920 (Essex County Dist. Ct. 1970).
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of Roseland claiming that its building inspector had wrongfully issued
a certificate of occupancy when he should have been aware that the
house had been improperly constructed and the land improperly
graded. 147 The trial court dismissed the complaint against the municpality on the grounds that the action of the building inspector was a
discretionary function requiring considerable skill 48 and also because
the protection of the landowner was not the purpose of the certificate
49
of occupancy.
Analyzed in light of the seminal New Jersey decisions on discretionary immunity,150 it would appear that the Fiducciacourt incorrectly
applied the term "discretionary," equating it with a decision-making
process requiring a high degree of skill. With respect to this point, the
court stated:
While issuance of a certificate of occupancy does not involve planning or policy functions, it does entail the exercise of discretion.
Not only must the building inspector determine whether there has
been compliance with building regulations and health regulations,
but whether the structure complies with the requirements of the
zoning ordinance. The books are replete with zoning cases which
demonstrate that this can be a task requiring considerable skill.' 51
However, a close reading of Amelchenko, Fitzgerald,Hoy and Visidor
will reveal that in each of those cases the court was discussing not the
fact that the decision was a technically difficult one, but the fact that
the governing body had to make a politically difficult choice, 152 involving
the weighing of such factors as tax ramifications'53 and the balancing of
Id. at 250, 262 A.2d at 921.
Id. at 255, 262 A.2d at 923.
149 Id., 262 A.2d at 924.
150 Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 48 N.J. 214, 225 A.2d 105 (1966); Hoy v.
Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 222 A.2d 649 (1966); Fitzgerald v. Palmer, 47 N.J. 106, 219 A.2d 512
(1966); Amelchenko v. Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541, 201 A.2d 726 (1964).
151 109 N.J. Super. at 254-55, 262 A2d at 923 (emphasis added).
152 In Amelchenko the problem was the quality of snow removal. On this issue the
court stated that to subject such decisions to review in tort suits "would take the ultimate
decision-making authority from those who are responsible politically for making the
decisions." 42 N.J. at 550, 201 A.2d at 730 (emphasis added).
In Fitzgerald the problem was the quality of road safety. The court stated that "there
is a political discretion as to what ought to be done." 47 N.J. at 109, 219 A.2d at 514
(emphasis added).
Both Hoy and Visidor cite favorably to Amelchenko and Fitzgerald. Hoy v. Capelli, 48
N.J. 81, 87-88, 222 A.2d 649, 652-53 (1966); Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park, 48
N.J. 214, 221, 225 A.2d 105, 108 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967). See also Judge
Larner's decision in A. & B. Auto Stores wherein he discusses the problems faced by the
city official in Newark. 106 N.J. Super. at 498-99, 256 A.2d at 114.
153 47 N.J. at 109, 219 A.2d at 514.
147

148
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different group interests.154 The court could not impose the tort standard of reasonableness on municipal governmental decisions because of
their subtle and esoteric nature, the justification for which could never
be brought out in the cold objectivity of a trial. However, a building
inspector's function presents a much different situation. While his job
undoubtedly requires a high degree of skill, the exercise of that skill
can be measured against an objective standard. Expert witnesses can
be brought in to testify as to what would be a reasonably prudent decision under similar circumstances. In addition, the inspector himself
can testify fully as to why he reached his decision. Also, in such a case
the court would not be guilty of intruding into an essential process of
another branch of government. The new doctrine of immunity is not
meant to shield all actions of the governing body entirely, only those
which are "basic governmental policy decisions.' 155
Furthermore, even assuming a broad interpretation of "discretionary," it is submitted that a building inspector's function involves no
choice. When a landowner has complied with the necessary prerequisites, a permit must issue. 56
CONCLUSION

While advances in the field of municipal immunity have been
made, both through a more impartial treatment of plaintiffs and a
simplification of the immunity rule and its exceptions, it is very questionable whether these innovations will provide a stable and comprehensible body of law with the limited purpose of protecting only fundamental decision-making. The very nature of the solution invites
controversy because of the difficulty in determining what is meant by
the term discretionary and to which level of governmental acts it is to
be applied. Recent lower court cases underscore this difficulty. Moreover, the approach of the supreme court itself has not been characterized by a preconceived and uniform design. The court developed the
57
present response prior to acknowledging the existence of a new test.

154 48 N.J. at 221-24, 225 A.2d at 108-10; 48 N.J. at 87-91, 222 A.2d at 652-55; 42 N.J. at
549-50, 201 A.2d at 730-31.
'55 48 N.J. at 550, 201 A.2d at 730-31.
156 Schack v. Trimble, 48 N.J. Super. 45, 50-51, 137 A.2d 22, 24-25 (App. Div. 1957);
Piscitelli v. Township Committee, 103 N.J. Super. 589, 598-99, 248 A.2d 274, 279 (L. Div.
1968). Both cases hold issuance of building permits under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-39 (1967),
is mandatory where property owner has complied with ordinance.

157 The cases delineating the strictures of the present immunity rule were decided
several years prior to the B. W. King decision. Compare B. W. King, Inc. v. Town of West
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Furthermore, the integrity of the rule was immediately undermined
when the court was faced with a situation wherein strict application
would have produced an inequitable result.
In light of the foregoing, it seems clear that the logical and simple
test which the supreme court has formulated will soon become so encumbered with numerous exceptions and technicalities that it will be
necessary to allow a completely new approach to "metamorphize."
Richard P. Cushing
New York, 49 N.J. 318, 230 A.2d 133 (1967) with Visidor Corp. v. Borough of Cliffside Park,
48 N.J. 214, 225 A.2d 105 (1966), cert. denied, 386 US. 106 (1967) and Amelchenko v.
Borough of Freehold, 42 N.J. 541, 201 A.2d 726 (1964).

